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Abstract
In an economy with distortionary taxes on labor, can subsidies on day care, ﬁnanced by
an increase in taxes, raise welfare by encouraging women with small children to work?
We show, within a heterogeneous-agent life-cycle framework, that the Ramsey optimal
policy consists in equalizing consumption/leisure wedges over the life cycle and across
agents. A simple way to implement this is to make day care expenses tax deductible.
Calibrating our model to Germany, we ﬁnd that tax deductibility for day care expenses
leads to an approximate doubling of labor supply for both married and single mothers
with small children. The overall welfare gain from optimal reform corresponds to a 1.0
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11 Introduction
In both Europe and North America, public support for preschool day care is on the rise.
At its Barcelona meeting in 2002, the European Union encouraged member countries to
supply subsidized full-day places for one-third of 0- to 3-year-olds, and for over 90% of all
3- to 6-year-olds by the year 2010. In the United States from 2002 to 2007, the fraction
of four-year-olds attending state-funded preschool education rose from 14 to 22 percent.
At the same time, U.S. state funding for preschool education rose from 2.4 to 3.7 billion
dollars.1 In Canada, partly inspired by the $5-a-day day care policy introduced in Qu´ ebec
in 1997, all major parties in the 2006 federal election campaign put forward proposals for
a national day care programme.
Is public funding for preschool day care a good idea? We approach this question from
an optimal taxation perspective, essentially in the spirit of Ramsey (1927). This means
that we ask whether day care subsidies can contribute to a more eﬃcient allocation of
resources.
There are of course several alternative justiﬁcations for government funding of day care
whose validity may be worth exploring. One is that subsidized day care might raise
fertility and thereby contribute to solving the problems generated by an aging population.
Another is that it might promote early learning, especially among disadvantaged children.
Meanwhile, day care subsidies tend to encourage female labor force participation, which
might be desirable either because it promotes equality within the household2 or because it
leads to a more eﬃcient allocation of resources. Here we focus entirely on the consequences
of day care subsidies for the allocation of resources.
In this paper, we make an optimal-taxation based case for subsidized day care. To do
1 Source: National Institute for Early Education Research, http://nieer.org.
2 Knowles (2006) shows that rising women’s wages relative to men’s wages has strengthened the relative
bargaining position of women within U.S. households. Since the introduction of day care subsidies raises
the eﬀective wage for women, it is likely to have the same eﬀect.
2this, we develop a heterogeneous-agent life-cycle framework where the demand for day
care arises from the assumption that every hour of work makes it necessary for the agent
to purchase an hour of day care per young child. A non-trivial optimal taxation problem
arises from the assumption that the government has an exogenous spending requirement
and that lump-sum taxes are ruled out but linear taxes and subsidies are allowed. Thus
the consumption/leisure choice is distorted and the problem is to minimize the total
welfare cost of this distortion.
Our main ﬁnding is that the optimal policy consists in equalizing the consumption/leisure
wedge over the life cycle and across agents, and that the most straightforward way to
accomplish this is to make day care expenses tax deductible.3 The intuitive reason for
that is the following. If day care is not subsidized or tax deductible and marginal taxes
rates are not conditional on the number of small children, then the presence of small
children reduces the ratio of marginal private to marginal social returns to working net
of day care expenses. This means that labor supply is more distorted the more small
children are present, and this is not consistent with minimizing the total distortion. What
is optimal is to even out the distortion. This is essentially a tax smoothing argument.
Having established this theoretical result, we then examine the quantitative signiﬁcance
of day care ﬁnance reform by calibrating our model to Germany. There are several strong
reasons for studying Germany in the context of day care policy. One, as emphasized in
a recent OECD survey of Germany (OECD, 2008), is that “fewer mothers with small
children are employed in Germany than in other countries and those who work do so for
fewer hours”. As we show in Figure 1, women with small children supply on average
60 percent fewer hours than other women. There is no corresponding diﬀerence between
fathers with small children and other men.4
3 Interestingly, Israel will be making day care expenses tax deductible starting in the ﬁscal year 2010,
following a decision by their Supreme Court. See Segal (2009).
4 Merz (2004) studies female labor supply trends in western Germany and ﬁnds that although partic-
ipation has risen somewhat, hours per female employee actually fell between 1980 and 2000, the net
3Another reason to consider Germany is that, until recently, availability of subsidized day
care is very limited there, especially in western Germany; see Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000),
Wrohlich (2005) and OECD (2006). On average, across the OECD countries for which
data are available, 23 percent of 0-3 year-olds are in formal day care. In Germany, that
number is just 9 percent, and in western Germany it is less than 3 percent.5
A further reason to study Germany is that its day care policy is currently in transition. In
2004, the SPD-Green federal government enacted the Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz; this
legislation requires that, each year, 1.5 billion euros have to be invested in day care, and
local authorities are responsible for supplying suﬃcient day care for children under the
age of three. The CDU/CSU-SPD government that took oﬃce in 2005 continued in the
same spirit. In 2007 the German government announced that it plans by 2013 to triple
the number of subsidized day care spots for young children to 750000.6 In 2008, the
Kinderf orderungsgesetz was passed in the Bundestag (federal parliament), establishing a
right to a day care spot for every child from the age of one.7 Recent reforms in Germany
have also included moves towards making day care expenses tax deductible.8 Our work
contributes to an evaluation of this and other day care ﬁnance reforms in Germany.
When calibrating our model to Germany, it is important to capture the way that labor
supply varies with the presence (or not) of small children in the household. In the data,
the extent of this variation is strongly associated with gender and marital status.9 Con-
result being almost no change in weekly market hours worked per woman. It is worth stressing that
Merz (2004) only studied west German data; once the new eastern Bundesl ander are taken into account,
female weekly or annual market hours worked per person did increase markedly after 1990, but that is
largely because of the addition of new women from the east who were already working more hours.
5 Sources: Wrohlich (2005) and OECD (2007).
6 Source: Deutsche Welle (2007).
7 For more details on these reforms and also appropriate references to German legislation, see the website
of the German federal ministry of families, seniors, women, and youth, http://www.bmfsfj.de/.
8 See Bundesregierung (2006).
9 When talking about marital status we are not interested in whether anyone is legally married, only
whether they are living in a relationship that is economically equivalent to marriage. Therefore we will
use the terms “married” and “cohabiting” interchangeably throughout the paper.
4sequently, we introduce heterogeneity with respect to these features. The introduction
of married couples into the model requires us to allow for households with two working
members, noting that tax deductibility of day care expenses is the Ramsey optimal policy
in this case as well.
Our quantitative ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Optimal day care reform leads
to substantial increases in the labor supply of mothers with small children.10 Speciﬁcally,
tax deductibility for day care expenses leads to an approximate doubling of labor supply
for both married and single mothers with small children. Meanwhile, the labor tax rate
increases by 0.4 percentage points. Optimal reform also has substantial welfare eﬀects.
Weighting households in such a way that the government has no redistributional motive
for subsidizing day care (setting Pareto weights inversely proportional to the marginal
utility of consumption), the overall welfare gains correspond to a 1.0 percent increase in
consumption. Among couples, the gains correspond to a 0.9 percent increase; for single
men this number is 0.8 percent, and for single women it is 2.0 percent.
Our main results are derived in an environment with linear taxes and no transfer pay-
ments. Meanwhile, the current German tax system is very far from linear and there is a
generous system of means-tested social assistance payments. In order to investigate the
robustness of our results to this policy context, we modify the model environment to be
broadly consistent with the existing framework of German ﬁscal policy. To focus sharply
on the eﬀects of day care ﬁnance reform, the policy changes that we consider keep other
aspects of the tax-transfer system unchanged, subject only to government solvency.
Keeping these other aspects unchanged, we ﬁnd that making day care expenses tax de-
ductible gives rise to an overall welfare gain corresponding to a 0.7 percent increase in
consumption. Interestingly, the reform pays for itself by encouraging people to work
rather than live on social assistance. This means that everyone gains from this reform.
10 The eﬀects of reform are compared to an initial situation where day care is neither subsidized nor tax
deductible.
5Since in this context we don’t have a theoretical result establishing deductibility as an
optimal policy, we also consider a set of alternative policies, speciﬁcally linear subsidies
on day care at various rates. The welfare gain for society as a whole turns out to be
maximized at a subsidy rate of about 85 percent. At this rate, the overall welfare gain is
0.8 percent, but because this policy involves a tax increase, only a bare majority of 50.1
percent prefer it to no reform at all. If voters were faced with the options of making day
care expenses tax deductible and introducing an 85 percent subsidy on day care, a clear
60 percent majority would vote for deductibility.
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. First, there is an empirical
literature documenting that subsidized day care may encourage labor supply of mothers.
The seminal work of Heckman (1974) presents strong evidence from the United States that
day care subsidies do indeed increase female labor supply; more recently, in a case more
directly relevant to this paper, Wrohlich (2006) ﬁnds, using an econometric approach, that
expanding availability of subsidized day care increases maternal employment in Germany.
Bick (2010) draws the same qualitative conclusion in the context of a calibrated life-cycle
model, though he ﬁnds a smaller eﬀect than Wrohlich (2006).11
Another strand considers the role of public policy in determining the choice between
home and market production. Lindbeck (1982) argues that subsidies to day care in
many countries has contributed to the increased labor supply of women, counteracting
the rise in tax rates that have been required to ﬁnance these subsidies.12 The reason
for Lindbeck’s conclusion is that he thinks, as we do, of market provided day care as a
close substitute for day care at home. Rosen (1997), on the other hand, considers, in the
11 The contrasting conclusions drawn by Wrohlich (2006) and Bick (2010) is that the latter assumes that
day care is not necessary even when both parents are working. Instead he assumes that the mother
suﬀers a utility cost from being away from her children and that this utility cost can be avoided by
purchasing day care. Our quantitative results lie between those of Wrohlich (2006) and those of Bick
(2010).
12 Bergstrom and Blomquist (1996) argue that the eﬀect on labor supply may be so large that subsidizing
day care is self-ﬁnancing; a similar result is found in Lundholm and Ohlsson (1998).
6context of a model conceptually similar to Lindbeck’s, whether high day care subsidies can
be justiﬁed and concludes that they cannot. This conclusion hinges on imposing a rather
low upper limit on the degree of substitutability between market and home produced day
care. Another important reason why our conclusions diﬀer from Rosen’s is that the tax
smoothing considerations central to our analysis are absent from his static model.
A third strand of the literature is concerned, as we are, with understanding female labor
supply. Much of that literature has focused on the remarkable rise of female labor force
participation since the 1950s in the United States. Prominent contributions include Jones
et al. (2003), Greenwood et al. (2005), and Olivetti (2006). More recently, Attanasio et al.
(2008) have emphasized the importance of reduced day care costs in explaining observed
changes in U.S. female participation rates.
Other related papers consider the role of ﬁscal policy in explaining diﬀerences in labor
supply across time and across countries, starting with Prescott (2004). Of particular
relevance to the present paper is the idea that diﬀerences in labor-supply-promoting public
spending may be an important factor in accounting for diﬀerences in labor supply across
countries, especially the diﬀerence between Scandinavia and (the rest of) continental
Europe; this idea is explored in Olovsson (2004), Ragan (2005), and Rogerson (2006).
Our work is also closely related to the growing literature on quantitative evaluation of
ﬁscal policy reforms in dynamic models with heterogeneity. A particularly relevant part
of the literature are those papers that deal with multi-member households, such as Chade
and Ventura (2002) and G¨ uner et al. (2008) who look at the eﬀects of income tax reforms
on labor supply and Erosa et al. (2008) who look at the eﬀects of parental leave policies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment, proves the optimal-
ity of equalizing consumption/leisure wedges and discusses how that can be implemented
by making day care expenses tax deductible. Section 3 provides a quantitative assessment
of optimal day care reform in Germany. Section 4 concludes.
72 Theory
Consider a T-period life-cycle model with I agents where at age s an agent i has bi
s small
children. The demand for day care arises from the following assumption: for every unit of
time that the agent works, it needs to purchase day care for each small child. Beyond that,
agents in the model are indiﬀerent to the presence of children; time spent with children
is like leisure spent without children, no better and no worse. The only signiﬁcance of
children in the model is that they require constant supervision and so day care is required
when the parent is working.
The resource cost of day care is d per unit of time and child. The government levies
age- and agent-dependent linear taxes on labor income (at rates τi
s) to ﬁnance exogenous
government purchases G and age- and agent-dependent linear subsidies on day care (at
rates θ
i
s). There is a world capital market that enables agents to transform one unit of
the age s good into 1 + r units of the age s + 1 good and vice versa without any non-
negativity restrictions on the amount saved. Each agent’s initial endowment of capital is
zero. Factor prices are exogenous.


















s: R+ ! R is an increasing, diﬀerentiable and concave function and vi
s: R+ ! R
is a decreasing, diﬀerentiable and concave function for each i and s, subject to the life-time











































s denotes consumption, hi
s denotes hours worked, wi
s denotes age-speciﬁc produc-
8tivity, xi





s = 0 (3)
for all s. These transfer payments are introduced only in order to simplify the proofs, and
in the equilibria we consider we will make assumptions to ensure that they are all zero.
Ri
s+1 is the after-tax gross rate of return between s and s + 1. Denoting the agent- and





s = 1 + (1   ξ
i
s)r.
Notice that we allow the disutility of labor, vi
s(h), to depend on age and on the agent’s
identity; this enables us to establish a slightly more general result than otherwise.
Assuming an interior solution, labor supply and consumption are characterized by the



















































thus suppressing the i and s arguments of u and v.


























where G denotes government consumption.
92.1 Ramsey government




















subject to (3), associated with the Lagrange multipliers νs, (6), associated with the La-
















for i = 1,2,...,I, associated with Lagrange multipliers φi.
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for i = 1,2,...,I and s = 1,2,...,T, where εi























We now characterize the Ramsey optimal allocation. We will establish that, under certain
conditions, the Ramsey optimal allocation equalizes the consumption/leisure wedge over











To see under what conditions it is optimal to equalize Wi
s over the life cycle, combine the
Ramsey government’s ﬁrst order conditions with respect to labor supply (Equation 11)
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πi + φi (1   σi
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This establishes the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 If (1) εi
s(h) = εi for all i, s and h, (2) σi
s(c) = σi for all i, s and c, and
(3) xi






for all s and t.
As is always the case, the Ramsey optimal allocation can be implemented in many dif-
ferent ways. Generically, in order to implement the Ramsey optimal policy, we need one
policy instrument per decision. If more instruments are available, the optimal policy is
not unique. In the present setting, we have two decisions (ci
s and hi






s) per agent and age. Since θ
i
s and τi
s both aﬀect the same
wedge Wi
s, they are not uniquely determined. Nevertheless, we can characterize the set
of optimal policies in the following way. The government should either subsidize day
care or give agents more favorable tax treatment in periods when more small children are
present. To give a more precise description of the set of optimal policies, it is useful to
13 Notice that this wedge is only well-deﬁned for those i and s such that (wi
s dbi
s) > 0, i.e. that the wage
exceeds the cost of day care. This is the rationale for the production of day care outside the family;





i. Because of the indeterminacy, this involves no loss of generality. Then, as
we will demonstrate below, there are only three possibilities, all consistent with Ramsey
optimality. One is for the subsidy rate to be low, θ
i < τi
s for all s. In this case, the
tax rate τi
s should be lower in those periods where a larger number of small children are
present. Another possibility is the converse, θ
i > τi
s for all s, and a higher tax rate in
those periods where a larger number of small children are present.
A ﬁnal possibility is to set τi
s = θ
i for all s. This means that the tax rate is constant
over the life cycle—surely an advantage from the point of view of simplicity. One way
to describe this policy is that it involves making day care expenses tax deductible and
equalizing tax rates over the life cycle. If taxes cannot vary over the life cycle, then this
is the uniquely optimal policy. This is what we mean when we say that it is optimal to
make day care expenses tax deductible.
To see that these are the only three possibilities consistent with Ramsey optimality, com-






























Notice that under the assumptions of Proposition 1 we have χi
s = χi > 0 for all s. Given
our assumption that wi
s > dbi
s for all i and s, this means that Equation (17) only allows
three possibilities: either θ
i
s < τi
s < χi for all s, θ
i
s > τi
s > χi for all s or θ
i
s = τi
s = χi for




















It follows that, as described above, there are only three possibilities that are consistent
with a Ramsey optimum. They are
121. τi
r > θ


















i for all r.
We will now discuss the signiﬁcance of the assumptions of Proposition 1. Suppose As-
sumption (1) does not hold and that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply varies over the




be set so that when the Frisch elasticity is lower (all else equal), the agent should face a




s, a natural feature of Ramsey optimal taxation.14
Suppose on the other hand that Assumption (2) does not hold and that σi
s varies over





t, all else equal. Finally,
note that Assumption (3), that xi
s = 0 for all i and s holds automatically (by Equation
3) when I = 1. We discuss below some conditions under which it holds more generally.
Having established conditions under which it is optimal to equalize the consumption/leisure
wedge over the life cycle, we now strengthen the conditions to guarantee that it should
be equalized across agents as well. Combining the Ramsey government’s ﬁrst order con-



































for all i, j, and s. This establishes the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 If, in addition to the assumptions of Proposition 1 we have (1) εi = ε for






for all i, j, s and t.
14 This has previously been discussed in a life-cycle setting by Erosa and Gervais (2002).
13Just as in the case of Proposition 1, the equalization of wedges can be accomplished
in three ways. The simplest one involves making day care expenses tax deductible and




s = τ for all i and s.
The conclusions of both Propositions 1 and 2 rely on xi
s = 0. What if transfers are non-




s (for some s, and
hence for all s) then τi R τj. In other words, if the Ramsey policy maker would like to
redistribute from agent i to agent j using transfers x, then the Ramsey policy maker also
wants to impose a higher labor tax on agent i than on j.
Under what conditions are zero transfers optimal? Intuitively, the desire of the government
to redistribute purchasing power should depend on the Pareto weights. Does there exist
a vector of Pareto weights π = (π1,π2,...,πI) such that xi
s = 0 for all s and i is optimal,
assuming of course the other premises of Propositions 1 and 2? If so, how can we go
about constructing such weights? What we can say is the following. First, note that what
matters are the relative Pareto weights so that we may assume without loss of generality
that
∑I
i=1 πi = 1. This leaves us with I   1 degrees of freedom when choosing Pareto
weights. Suppose now that there exists a vector π of Pareto weights and an associated
allocation that satisﬁes the Ramsey optimality conditions and xi
1 = 0 for all i. This
is a reasonable assumption; we can use the I   1 degrees of freedom in choosing the
Pareto weights to ensure that xi
1 = 0 for i = 1,2,...,I   1; Equation (3) ensures that
xI
1 = 0 also. Then, using Equations (3), (9) and (10), it is straightforward to show that
this allocation is such that xi
s = 0 for all s and i. Moreover, it follows that the weights
must be inversely proportional to marginal utilities of consumption, a natural result given
that maximization of (7) implies a redistributional motive whenever agents diﬀer in their
weighted marginal utility of consumption.
In the quantitative exercises of Section 3, we will conﬁne our attention to situations
where the policy maker has no redistributive motive. This means that we will calibrate
14the Pareto weights to be inversely proportional to the marginal utility of consumption
and that we will only consider reforms that involve age- and agent-independent tax and
subsidy rates.
So far, we have only discussed labor taxes and day care subsidies. It turns out that,
under the assumptions of Proposition 2, optimal capital income taxes are zero. To see























Hence if we have σi
s(ci
s) = σi and xi
s = 0 for all i and s then ξ
i
s = 0 for all i and s so that
capital income taxes are zero in the Ramsey optimum.
We end this section with a discussion of the factors that determine the magnitude of the
eﬀects on allocations and welfare from optimal reform. What that magnitude depends
on is the degree to which the consumption/leisure wedge Wi
s is not equal across diﬀerent
values of s in the initial situation. When this wedge is nearly equal over the life cycle,
there is not much for day care subsidies to accomplish; when it varies a lot over the life
cycle, optimal day care subsidies have large eﬀects on labor supply and on welfare. We
now consider what conditions might lead the wedge to vary over the life cycle. Note that,
by the agent’s ﬁrst order condition, we can express it as the ratio of the marginal private














Important factors that lead to Wi
s being diﬀerent for diﬀerent values of s include the unit
day care cost, the spacing of children and the initial level of taxation. To see this in more
detail, consider an initial situation where θ
i
s = 0 and τi











Evidently the wedge is constant as a function of s if τ = 0 so there is no rationale for
day care subsidy reform in an economy with zero labor taxes. If τ > 0 then the wedge
15is a decreasing function of dbi
s which means that the higher the hourly day care cost per
child and the greater the number of children, the more severe is the consumption/leisure
distortion. This in turn means that the eﬀects of optimal reform will be greater the
greater the extent to which having children is conﬁned to a small part of the life cycle.
2.3 Discussion
The main optimal taxation result that we have established in this paper says that con-
sumption/leisure wedges should be equalized across ages and across agents. This means
that our work is related to the uniform commodity taxation result of Sandmo (1974).
What he shows is that if utility is separable in labor and commodities and homogeneous
(of arbitrary degree) in the commodities, then commodities should be taxed uniformly.
We prove a somewhat stronger result in an environment where labor is supplied in sev-
eral periods. Under assumptions that imply Sandmo’s and also assuming that the Frisch
(1959) elasticity of labor supply is constant and age-independent, then labor supply at
diﬀerent ages should be taxed uniformly as well. Another dimension in which we go
beyond Sandmo is that we allow for heterogeneous agents and establish conditions un-
der which all agents should face the same tax rates. Finally, and perhaps this is the
most important novel feature of our work, our approach allows us to interpret uniform
consumption/leisure wedges as giving favorable tax treatment to households with small
children.
The connection to the eﬃciency-in-production result of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) is
looser. The result of that paper is that technical rates of substitution should be equalized
across sectors. That result does not apply to our environment, since labor inputs from dif-
ferent individuals are perfect substitutes. Technical rates of substitution are exogenously
ﬁxed and thus either happen to be equal or cannot be equalized.
Meanwhile, our work is obviously related to that of Erosa and Gervais (2002). In that
16context it is worth noting that the optimality of age-independent tax rates and subsidies
hinges on the Frisch elasticity being constant. If it is not, taxes and subsidies should
typically be age-dependent, a feature of Ramsey optimal policy that is emphasized in
their work.
3 A quantitative assessment of optimal day care re-
form
In this section we use the model laid out in Section 2 to provide a quantitative assessment
of optimal day care reform. We calibrate the model to match some key features of the
German economy. In particular, we want to capture the way that labor supply varies with
the presence (or not) of small children in the household. In the data, the extent of this
variation is strongly associated with gender and marital status. Consequently, we intro-
duce heterogeneity with respect to these features. Formally, introducing married couples
requires us to extend the model to incorporate households with two adult members, but
this extension does not undermine any of the theoretical results established in Section 2; a
proof of this is conceptually straightforward but heavy in notation and therefore omitted
here. Moreover, the calibrated model features overlapping generations as opposed to just
a single life cycle; the theoretical results survive this extension as well, provided that the
Pareto weights of the generations decline geometrically at a rate given by the households’
subjective discount factor β.
We now describe how married couples are incorporated into the model economy. The
economy is populated by I households, some of which are lifelong couples and some of
which are lifelong singles. Singles still solve (1) subject to (2) provided that we suppress








































































where the superscript i,m represents the man and i,f represents the woman of household
i. (Again, we suppress dependence on birth cohort.) The idea behind the minfhm
s ,hf
sg
expression in the budget constraint is that day care has to be purchased for every hour
that both parents work in the market and that shift work is not allowed.
3.1 Calibration
As discussed in Section 2.2, the optimal policy consists in equalizing across households
and age a certain wedge, deﬁned in Equation (22). This wedge depends on the number of
small children, the wage, the pre-reform tax rate and the per-unit day care cost. Therefore
the calibration should replicate some of the main facts about how these variables are
distributed. We now discuss these facts in turn.
3.1.1 Population
The model population is designed to reﬂect the German population in terms of the number
of singles and married couples and the distribution of children. The data that we use for
this purpose are from the database (G)SOEP, see http://www.diw.de.15 A household is
15 For a more detailed description of this dataset, see Appendix A.
18deﬁned in this context as a set of people living at the same address. Two adults living in
the same household are counted as a couple if (1) they are the two eldest in the household,
(2) they are of the opposite sex, and (3) the age diﬀerence is strictly less than 20 years.
In GSOEP data from 1984 to 2004, about 72 percent of people between the ages of 20
and 62 are cohabitors in this sense; this is what we assume for the model population as
well. Half of the single people in the model are assumed to be male, and the other half
female.
Children are distributed among households in such a way as to replicate the key features
of the data. We assume that the length of a time period is six years. Adults are assumed
to live for T = 10 periods, the last three periods being spent in retirement and we think
of the ﬁrst period of adult life as 20-25 years of age. Children live with their parents for
three periods, and we assume that they require constant supervision only during their ﬁrst
period of life. Newborn children may arrive when the parents are aged 1-4 (corresponding
to 20-44 years). At age 1, the maximum number of newborns is 2, reﬂecting the fact
that young parents very rarely have more than two children. For ages 2-4, the maximum
number of newborns is 3. In addition, we set an upper limit on completed fertility at 3
children. This gives rise to 34 diﬀerent possible cases and hence our model population
has 34 diﬀerent child proﬁle types for each of the groups single men, single women and
couples. To determine population shares of these types, we proceed as follows. First we
use GSOEP data to compute the probabilities of children arriving as a function of family
characteristics such as age, number of existing children, marital status and, for singles,
gender. Then, for each of the groups single men, single women and couples, we simulate
a large population on the basis of these probabilities. Based on these populations, we can
determine the population shares of each of the 34 child proﬁles.
By construction, these population shares ensure that we match the following features of
our GSOEP sample; 3.6 percent of single men, 6.9 percent of single women, and 13.2
percent of couples have small (0-5 years old) children at any given point in time. These
19population shares also imply that 18.5 percent of the model population is between 0 and
17 years old. Reassuringly, according to Eurostat, the corresponding number for the entire
population of Germany was 18.2 percent in 2004.
3.1.2 Wages and taxes
To generate a wage distribution that reﬂects the key features of its empirical counter-
part, we let wages depend on age, marital status, gender and (permanent) productivity
type. Wage proﬁles are calibrated on the basis of a regression of the log wage16 on time
dummies, age in years, gender and marital status. Speciﬁcally, the regression coeﬃcients
are 0.0405 (the age premium),  0.0004 (the coeﬃcient on age squared), 0.174 (the male
wage premium),  0.0399 (the gender-independent cohabitation eﬀect) and, ﬁnally, 0.0125
(the male-speciﬁc cohabitation eﬀect). The residuals of this regression are then modelled
as the sum of a purely transitory measurement error and an individual ﬁxed eﬀect. The
variance of the ﬁxed eﬀect can then be backed out from the autocovariance of the residual.
This autocovariance provides the basis for our modelling of productivity types. In the
model we assume that there are two productivity types (high and low). To replicate the
empirical autocovariance, we give the high type a wage that is 92.4 percent above that
of the low type. Among singles, there are as many high types as there are low types.
Among couples, there are four possible combinations; the population shares of each are
set so as to match the correlation between spouses’ permanent productivity types. This
correlation is 0.27 (with a standard error of 0.0045). Imposing symmetry, this corresponds
to 28 percent of couples being high-high/low-low and 22 percent high-low/low-high.
The pre-reform labor tax rate τ is set to 46 percent, which is the combined average
eﬀective labor and consumption taxes 1991-97 as reported in Carey and Tchilinguirian
(2000).
16 In the data, the wage is deﬁned as the ratio of labor earnings to hours worked.
203.1.3 Preferences and the cost of day care









Meanwhile, the disutility of labor is given by
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i;g





where g 2 fm,fg.
The consumption equivalents, η, are calculated using the OECD consumption equivalence
scale. According to this scale, the ﬁrst adult counts as one unit, the second adult as 0.7
and each child as 0.5.
The parameter ε, representing the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, is set to 0.5; see
Domeij and Flod´ en (2006) and Pistaferri (2003). The reciprocal of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for consumption, σ, is set to 2. The parameter β is set to 0.976
and the interest rate r is set so that the subjective and market discount rates are equal;
r = 1/β   1.
The disutility of labor parameters ψ
i;g are set so as to match average labor supply by
marital status (cohabiting or single) and age group (26-43 and 44-61) for those without
small children.17 Parameter values are given in Table 1. The day care cost parameter d is
set so as to match the labor supply of single mothers with small children and is discussed
further below. The results of the calibration are shown in Table 2.
17 We exclude the hours worked by 18-25-year-olds from the calibration target since many people in this
age group are students; this fact has a big impact on labor supply in this age range (see Figure 1) in a
way that our model is not designed to capture.
21Table 1: Disutility of labor parameter values
Cohabiting Single
Females Males Females Males
Age 20-43 142 80 260 90
Age 44-61 142 90 272 104
Table 2: Hours per year
Data Model
Ages 26-43 44-61 26-43 44-61
Cohabiting men with children 2189   2284  
Cohabiting men without children 2223 2219 2225 2220
Cohabiting women with children 596   511  
Cohabiting women without children 1529 1625 1533 1629
Single men with children 2159   1225  
Single men without children 1969 1974 1969 1978
Single women with children 657   655  
Single women without children 1663 1765 1667 1769
Not a calibration target.
Note: A child in this context is one below the age of 6.
Data source: GSOEP
Although we do not target the labor supplies of married men and women with small
children, we nevertheless match them quite well. However, the model does not capture
the behavior of single men with small children, who in the data actually work more than
single men without small children at home. The model as speciﬁed can only replicate
this fact if we assume that single men with children have a much smaller disutility of
working than single men without children. This is not only a questionable assumption as
22such, but would tend to push the results in the direction of larger welfare gains from day
care subsidies. In this context it is worth recalling that only a rather small fraction, 3.6
percent, of single men have small children at home. Figures 2 and 3 show that the model
also captures the complete life-cycle proﬁle of hours worked, with the exception of single
men with children where we miss the level but capture the slope.
The numbers we target are average hours worked rather than participation and hours per
worker separately. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the model’s implications
for participation are broadly in line with the data with the exception of single men with
children. Our ﬁndings are summarized in Table 3. Since the model has full employment
among those without children, we focus on the employment rate of those with small
children relative to those without.
Table 3: Participation rates for those with
small children relative to those without
Data Model
Ages 26-43 26-43
Cohabiting men 1.01 1.00
Cohabiting women 0.56 0.61
Single men 1.07 0.89
Single women 0.60 0.68
Data source: GSOEP
The parameter d determining the real cost of day care corresponds to 5.15 per hour (at
2004 prices); recall that this number is chosen so that single mothers with small children
work as much on average in the model as in the data. This cost corresponds to 43% of the
wage of an average young woman (age 20-25). It is also worth noting that this number is
very close to the rate recommended by the Bundesverband f ur Kindertagespege (German
National Day Care Association), which is 5.50.18 More direct evidence on hourly day
18 See http://www.tagesmutter.net/themen/infos-fuer-tagesmuetter/finanzen-teil-2.html.
23care costs in Germany is hard to come by because of the small size of the day care sector
in Germany.19 On the other hand, direct evidence on hourly costs of day care is available
for the United States and Sweden. According to U.S. Census Bureau (2005), the average
ratio of day care costs to earnings for full-time working mothers is about 20 percent
in the United States. In Sweden, the cost of a day care spot varies quite a bit across
municipalities. In the municipality of T¨ aby, where day care costs are the lowest in the
nation, the costs correspond to about 38 percent of the wage of a young woman (age
18-24). Meanwhile, the Swedish national average cost of day care is about 53 percent
of young women’s wages.20 It is also worth noting that in the steady-state equilibrium,
about 0.88 percent of GNP is spent on day care; the corresponding number in Germany
is 0.59 percent.21
3.2 Eﬀects of day care reform
We now consider the eﬀects of adopting the Ramsey optimal policy, i.e. making day care
expenses tax deductible. We design the reform in such a way that those already born
at the moment of reform are not aﬀected; they pay their taxes taxes according to the
old system. We adopt this approach in order to avoid any issues of intergenerational
redistribution. In particular, we want to avoid the result that the initial old and middle-
aged lose from the reform simply because they pay for it but get nothing in return. Such
a result would not be particularly interesting. Because of the grandfather clause of our
reform, no agent experiences any transition. Nevertheless, we solve for the transition at
the aggregate level; this is necessary in order to ensure intertemporal government budget
balance. When evaluating welfare gains for a group of households, we use weights that are
19 Wrohlich (2005) documents the extent to which demand for subsidized day care falls short of the rather
small supply of it.
20 Source: SCB (2007).
21 Source: OECD (2006).
24inversely proportional to the marginal utility of consumption as discussed in Section 2.2.
The eﬀects of day care expense deductibility on labor supply are summarized in Table 4.
Hours worked by mothers with small children approximately double. Because the reform
involves a 0.4 percentage point tax increase, labor supply is reduced slightly for some
groups. Nevertheless, aggregate labor supply increases by 1.7 percent. Meanwhile, GNP
increases by 1.1 percent and resources allocated to day care go up from 0.88 percent of
GNP to 1.88 percent.
Table 4: Hours per year
Pre-reform Post-reform
Ages 26-43 44-61 26-43 44-61
Cohabiting men with children 2284   2251  
Cohabiting men without children 2225 2220 2207 2197
Cohabiting women with children 511   1040  
Cohabiting women without children 1533 1629 1520 1611
Single men with children 1225   1749  
Single men without children 1969 1978 1958 1956
Single women with children 655   1260  
Single women without children 1667 1769 1644 1734
Note: A child in this context is one below the age of 6.
The overall welfare welfare gains from introducing tax deductibility of day care expenses
correspond to a 1.0 percent increase in consumption. For couples it corresponds to a 0.9
percent increase in consumption; for single men the number is 0.8 percent, and for single
women it is 2.0 percent.
Underlying the aggregated welfare gains, there is considerable heterogeneity, the details of
which are depicted in Figure 4. A 59 percent majority supports making day care expenses
25tax deductible. Breaking down this ﬁgure by demographics, we ﬁnd that 67 percent of
cohabiting couples, 48 percent of single women and 26 percent of single men support
moving from not subsidizing day care at all to making it fully tax deductible. Who are
the opponents? Because the reform involves a tax increase, those who never have children
have nothing to gain from the reform.22 In addition to the childless, there is a category
of people who do not beneﬁt from the reform because in those periods when they have
children, their net marginal product of labor w db is negative (for couples, what matters
is the lowest net marginal product). This means that, in those periods, it does not pay
to work even when day care expenses are tax deductible.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
The results above are computed in an environment with linear taxes and zero transfer
payments. Meanwhile, the current German tax system is very far from linear and there is a
generous system of means-tested social assistance. In order to investigate the robustness
of our results to this policy context, we modify the model environment to be broadly
consistent with the existing framework of German ﬁscal policy. In this context, there are
many policy changes one might want to consider. However, this paper is about day care
ﬁnance reform and so the policy changes that we consider in this section all keep the
rest of the tax and transfer system unchanged, subject only to government solvency.23
With this restriction on the set of reforms, tax deductibility of day care expenses in not
necessarily optimal anymore. We still consider such a policy, where what we mean by
deductibility is that both taxes and transfers are computed on the basis of earnings less
day care expenses. In addition, we also consider subsidizing day care at various rates.
22 15 percent of couples in the model never have children; the corresponding number for single men is 73
percent and for single women it is 48 percent.
23 The reforms are ﬁnanced by a vertical shift of the marginal tax schedule for those income levels where
taxes are paid. See Figure 5 for a depiction of the German marginal tax schedule.
26We model the German labor income tax schedule following the description in OECD
(2005). For example, the average and marginal tax rates for a single individual with one
child are displayed in Figure 5. Consumption is taxed separately from labor income at
the rate 15.8 percent, taken from Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000).24 We model transfers
following the description of German social assistance policies in Adema and Kahl (2003).
For example, a single woman with one small child receives 884 per month and a married
couple with one child 7 years or younger and one child older than 7 receives 1263 per
month. Transfers are generally clawed back at a rate of 85 percent as household income
rises. See Appendix B for details.
Having introduced this tax and transfer system into the model, we calibrate the disutility
of labor parameters ψ
i;g
s in order to match hours worked for those without children and we
set the day care cost parameter d so as to match hours worked for single women with small
children, as described in Section 3.1. Recall that in the context of the model with linear
taxes and no transfers, such a calibration strategy implied that we also approximately
matched the labor of supply of married women with small children, though that was not
an explicit calibration target. However, in this context, the means-tested transfer system
signiﬁcantly weakens the incentives for single mothers to work. In order to match their
labor supply, the cost of day care needs to be about 2.57 per hour, which is lower than in
the model with linear taxes. At this lower cost, married women with small children, very
few of whom enjoy any transfer payments on account of their husbands’ earnings, face
stronger incentives to work. The model therefore needs to be modiﬁed in order to avoid
implying counterfactually high hours worked for married mothers with small children.
The modiﬁcation that we adopt, following G¨ uner et al. (2008), is to introduce a utility
cost of participation for married couples. This cost is incurred if and only if both spouses
work. We set this parameter so as to match average hours worked by married mothers
with small children. With this extension, we are able to match our calibration targets
24 The value added tax in Germany is 19 percent on most goods and services and 7 percent for food.
Day care is not subject to value added tax.
27very closely.
Our calibration is further validated by the following observations. Before the reform,
28 percent of single mothers in the model receive social assistance. The corresponding
number in the data, according to Adema and Kahl (2003), was 26 percent in the year
2000. According to the same source, 1.9 percent of married couples with children received
social assistance in 2000; in the model, that number is 1.5 percent.
In this context, making day care expenses tax deductible gives rise to an overall welfare
gain corresponding to a 0.7 percent increase in consumption. The reform pays for itself by
encouraging people to work rather than live on social assistance; rather than increasing
taxes to pay for it, the reform involves a tax cut. (The marginal tax schedule shifts down
by 0.7 percentage points.) The fraction of single mothers for whom social assistance is
the chief source of income falls from 24 percent to 12 percent. For married couples with
children, the corresponding numbers are 0.5 and 0.4 percent. Aggregate social assistance
payments fall from 0.6 to 0.3 percent of GNP. Because of the tax reduction, there is
unanimous support for this reform when compared to the initial situation where day care
expenses are not deductible and not subsidized.25
Since in this context we don’t have a theoretical result establishing deductibility as the
optimal policy, we now consider a set of alternative policies, speciﬁcally linear subsidies
on day care at various rates. The beneﬁts of such policies are depicted in Figure 6 which
shows the welfare gains for each of the major groups (single men, single women and
married couples) as a function of the subsidy rate from zero up to 100 percent. The
welfare gain for society as a whole (using Pareto weights as described in Section 2.2) is
maximized at a subsidy rate of about 85 percent. At this rate, the overall welfare gain is
0.8 percent, but because this policy involves a tax increase, only a bare majority of 50.1
25 Given that the presence of means-tested social assistance provides a further argument in favor of day
care ﬁnance reform, it is perhaps surprising that the welfare gains are not even larger in this new
context than they were in Section 3.2. The reason they are not larger is that the unit resource cost of
day care d is lower here, as discussed on page 27.
28percent prefer it to the initial situation.
What policy enjoys the most public support? Suppose we are in the initial situation and
the options for reform are (1) retain the status quo, (2) let day care expenses be tax
deductible and (3) subsidize day care at a rate of 85 percent. If voters choose the option
they like best (and in this context there is no tactical reason why they wouldn’t), then
about 60 percent would vote for deductibility and about 40 percent would support an 85
percent subsidy.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have shown, within a heterogeneous-agent life-cycle framework, that
the Ramsey optimal policy is to make day care expenses tax deductible. Calibrating our
model to Germany, we found that implementing tax deductibility for day care would make
German mothers work signiﬁcantly more, leading to a sizeable welfare gain by moving
the economy toward a more eﬃcient trade-oﬀ between consumption and leisure.
In our analysis we have not considered the possible eﬀects of day care on child welfare
and development. It is an open question whether taking these eﬀects into account would
weaken or strengthen the case for deductibility of day care. There is some evidence that
day care has a positive eﬀect on child development and parental welfare; see OECD (2006).
If we trust this evidence, then our assessment of the beneﬁts of day care subsidies are
conservative. On the other hand, Baker et al. (2005) ﬁnd some evidence of negative eﬀects
from the province of Qu´ ebec. More recently, Gruber et al. (2010) have found statistically
insigniﬁcant eﬀects of day care on people born in Sweden 1974-88, a time and place where
subsidized day care expanded rapidly. Thus the issue remains unsettled. Either way,
there is a strong eﬃciency case to be made for day care subsidies that must be weighed
against any possible negative eﬀects.
29Appendix A Data
Our main source of data is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1984-
2004. More information about SOEP can be found at http://www.diw.de/english/
soep/29012.html.
A.1 Measurement of marital status
Conceptually, we are not interested in whether anyone is legally married, only whether
they are living with one other person in a relationship that is economically similar to
marriage. The approach we adopt is an imperfect attempt to capture that notion. What
we do is to group people who belong to the same household and try to pick out among
the adult members of a given household a pair of individuals who appear to be in a
marriage-like relationship. If the household has just one adult member, the situation is
clear: we then consider the sole household member to be single. On the other hand, if
the household has more than one adult member, then we order the household members
by age and consider the two eldest. Occasionally it happens that there are more than
two eldest members; we then randomly choose two of them. If these two indididuals turn
out to be of the opposite sex and if the age gap is strictly less than 20 years, we consider
them to be married. The exclusion of same-sex couples is there because we are interested
in using marital status information to draw inferences about the probability of the arrival
of children, and the exclusion of couples 20 years apart or more in age is there to exclude
single parents living with their children from being assigned as married.
Evidently our approach excludes some couples that, conceptually speaking, are married
in the economic sense of that term. Nevertheless, we take the view that our approach
yields an acceptable approximation.
30A.2 Probabilities of having children
As described in the main text, the distribution of children among households in the model
is based on simulating large populations of single men, single women and couples on the
basis of probabilities of newborn children arrivals that are taken from the data. Based on
these populations, we can then determine the population weights of each of the 34 child
proﬁles.
The probabilities of having (acquiring26) 0, 1, 2 and 3 children (more than that is not
allowed in any given six-year period) for single men, single women and couples are set so
as to match the number of young (less than six years old) children that these categories
of household have (possess) as a function of the age of the parents and the number of
children already present in the household, i.e. those children that are between the ages of
six and seventeen. Since the fraction of young parents who have more than two children
is tiny, we force this fraction to be zero.
In the GSOEP ﬁles Xkind (where X is a letter representing the year), there is an entry
corresponding to each child in the sample with information on birthyear and a number
identifying the household. We then merge this data with the information on marital
status, age, and, if unmarried, the gender of each apparent parent (any adult in the same
household as the child), and remove those adult-children pairs that are such that the
child is less than 18 years younger than the parent. We then consider those children that
are between 0 and 5 years old; these are considered “newborn” for the purpose of the
calibration. The probabilities of having 0, 1, 2 and 3 new children for potential parents
categorized by marital status, age, gender and number of children aged 6-17 are then
simply given by the corresponding fractions in the data, e.g. the fraction of 26-30-year-old
single women with two children aged 6-17 who have exactly one child between 0 and 5.
26 It is of course not idiomatic in English to speak of a household “acquiring” a child, but in this context
it is crucial to distinguish between possession and acquisition, and here we are talking about acquisition
and not possession.
31A.3 Life-cycle hours proﬁles
The data on hours are based on the GSOEP variable “average hours worked per week”,
called, for example, BP41 in 1985 and NP47 in 1997. What we would like to do is to
match the life-cycle proﬁle of hours worked for the ﬁrst cohort to be aﬀected in a major
way by day care reform, i.e. those who are young today. For obvious reasons, there is
no data on the entire life-cycle proﬁle of hours for this cohort. Therefore, we use the
entire GSOEP panel from 1984 to 2004 and regress hours on age and cohort dummies
representing the decade of birth. The data presented in Figure 1 are the predicted values
for the cohort born in the 1960s.
A.4 Wages
Wages are deﬁned as individual annual labor earnings divided by annual hours worked.
The names of these GSOEP variables are e11101XX and i11110XX, where the XX stands
for the year. These wages are used to run the regressions described in Section 3.1.2.
Appendix B Tax and transfer system
B.1 Tax system
The German tax system is modelled following the description in OECD (2005). Spouses
are assessed jointly using the income splitting method. We deﬁne taxable income, x, as
earnings less a basic allowance which consists of three parts. First, there is a allowance of
1308 for single parents. Second, there is a work-related allowance of 920 per employed
person. Third, there is lump-sum allowance of 36 for singles and 72 for couples.
The tax liability, T, is then calculated as follows. Let y = (x   7664)/1000 and z =
32(x   12739)/10000. The tax liability is then
T =

     
     
0 if x  7664,
(793.10y + 1600)y if 7664 < x  12739,
(265.78z + 2045)z + 1016 if 12739 < x  52152,
(0.48x   10410) if 52152 < x.
These formulae are used directly to calculate the tax liability for a single individual. For
couples, we apply these formulae on half the taxable income and then double the resulting
amount to arrive at the tax liability. A “solidarity surcharge” (Solidarit atszuschlag) is
then levied at 5.5 percent of the tax liability subject to an exemption limit of 972 for
singles and 1944 for couples. Total tax payments are equal to the tax liability plus the
solidarity surcharge. Note ﬁnally that we do not model social security contributions or
beneﬁts. The reason is that a large part of beneﬁts are tied to contributions in a more
or less actuarially fair way which means that the system of social insurance contributions
and beneﬁts is not distortive in the way that income taxes and public purchases are.
B.2 Social assistance
German social assistance policies are modelled following the description in Adema and
Kahl (2003). First, there is a universal child beneﬁt (Kindergeld) of 154 per child and
month.27 Second, there is an gross income tested child rearing beneﬁt of 307 per month
for children below 2 years of age. Third, households with little earnings are entitled to
several additional beneﬁts. For example, a single parent receives a standard monthly
payment of 286 plus 395 for housing, 67 for heating, 121 for larger purchases such
as clothing and furniture, and child payments of 169 per child not yet 7 years of age
and 232 for per child 7 years and older. The sum of these social assistance payments
27 Legally, the child beneﬁt is treated as a tax credit, but in cases where the tax liability is less than the
tax credit, the diﬀerence is paid out as a cash transfer. The child beneﬁt is equivalent to a direct cash
transfer, and we have therefore chosen to model it as such.
33are reduced by 85% of earnings net of taxes. Table B1 summarizes the German social
assistance beneﬁts.
Table B1: German social assistance policies per month in euros
Single Couple Single Couple
without children with children
Child beneﬁt per child 154 154
Net-earnings based beneﬁtsa
Standard payment 286 515 286 515
Average housing 357 335 395 444
Average heating 44 60 67 67
Large purchases 46 85 121 159
Children not yet 7 years of age (per child) 15 0
Children 7 years and older (per child) 78 78
Child rearing per child not yet 2 years of agea 307 307
aThese beneﬁts are clawed back at the rate 85 percent as after-tax earnings rise.
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Figure 1: Average hours worked over the life cycle in Germany. Solid lines refer to
people without small children, dashed lines to people with small children. For details, see
Appendix A.













Cohabiting men without small children













Cohabiting women without small children













Cohabiting men with small children













Cohabiting women with small children
Figure 2: Average hours worked over the life cycle in the data and in the model for co-
habiting men and women. Solid lines refer to the data, dashed lines to model predictions.













Single men without small children













Single women without small children













Single men with small children













Single women with small children
Figure 3: Average hours worked over the life cycle in the data and in the model for single
men and women. Solid lines refer to the data, dashed lines to model predictions.











































Figure 4: The distribution of welfare gains.



































Figure 5: Average and marginal tax rates for a single individual with one child.







































Figure 6: Welfare gains associated with day care subsidies between 0 and 100 percent in
the economy with progressive taxes and means-tested social assistance.
43